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Models of self-regulation propose that negative affect is generated when progress towards goals is
perceived to be inadequate. Similarly, ruminative thinking is hypothesised to be triggered by
unattained goals (Martin & Tesser, 1996). We conducted an experience-sampling study in which
participants recorded their negative affect, ruminative self-focus, and goal appraisals eight times daily
for one week. Negative affect and ruminative self-focus were each associated with low levels of goal
success and (with the exception of sadness) high levels of goal importance. As predicted, the
combination of low goal success and high goal importance was associated with the highest levels of
negative affect, and this interaction was marginally significant for ruminative self-focus. Decom-
position of the ruminative self-focus measure revealed that the success by importance interaction was
significantly associated with focus on problems but not focus on feelings. Findings did not differ for
individuals reporting high versus low levels of depressive symptoms or trait rumination. These results
suggest that self-regulatory models of goal pursuit provide a useful explanatory framework for the
study of affect and ruminative thinking in everyday life.
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Leading theories of self-regulation propose that
affect is central to motivated behaviour (e.g.,
Carver & Scheier, 1998). Specifically, these
approaches suggest that affect is closely related
to perceived rates of progress towards personal
goals. High perceived rates of goal progress are
associated with positive affect, whereas low rates
of goal progress are associated with negative
affect. Consistent with this, Brunstein (1993)
found that perceived progress towards the accom-
plishment of life goals prospectively predicted levels
of subjective well-being among undergraduates.
Perceived difficulties in goal pursuit may also
have cognitive consequences. Martin and Tesser
(1996) suggested that discrepancies in self-regu-
latory feedback processes underlie rumination,
defined as ‘‘a class of conscious thoughts that
revolve around a common instrumental theme and
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mental demands requiring the thoughts’’ (p. 1).
Although this definition is valence-neutral in that
rumination may include phenomena such as
dwelling on successful experiences, Martin and
Tesser (1996) proposed that rumination is most
commonly prompted by problems in goal achieve-
ment. Nolen-Hoeksema (1991) proposed a more
restricted conceptualisation of rumination in the
context of depressed mood, defining it as ‘‘repeti-
tively focusing on the fact that one is depressed;
on one’s symptoms of depression; and on the
causes, meanings, and consequences of depressive
symptoms’’ (p. 569). Considerable evidence exists
to show that this type of dysphoric rumination
prolongs sad mood relative to engagement in
pleasant, distracting activities and exacerbates
negative cognitive styles (see Lyubomirsky &
Tkach, 2004).
There have only been a few studies that have
linked problematic goal attainment with rumina-
tion, consistent with Martin and Tesser’s (1996)
theory. For example, Millar, Tesser, and Millar
(1988) found that the extent to which an
individual was unable to continue activities with
a significant other after leaving college was
positively associated with ruminative thoughts
about that person. Rumination about unattained
goals is hypothesised to be most intense when
these goals are linked to important, higher-level
outcomes (Martin & Tesser, 1996). Consistent
with this, McIntosh, Harlow, and Martin (1995)
found that participants who habitually linked
their lower-level goals (e.g., losing weight) to
the attainment of higher-order goals (e.g., being
happy) reported more rumination than partici-
pants who did not link their goals in this way.
Furthermore, over a two-week interval, everyday
hassles were more predictive of depressive symp-
tomatology for linkers than for non-linkers.
However, these studies only provide indirect
support for the Martin and Tesser (1996) hypoth-
esis because they did not directly examine how
appraisals of importance and success for
idiographic goals are associated with rumination.
Given the centrality of the Martin and
Tesser (1996) theory in the conceptualisation of
rumination, it seems important that predictions
from this influential theory are tested more
directly.
Moreover, few studies have attempted to
capture the relationships between affect or rumi-
native thinking and goal appraisals using multiple
ecologically valid assessments. Affleck et al.
(1998) asked fibromyalgia patients to complete
mood measures several times daily and rate their
progress towards a self-selected interpersonal goal.
Regardless of concurrent levels of pain and
fatigue, daily reports of goal progress were
associated with within-day increases in positive
affect. Similarly, a daily diary study by Harris,
Daniels, and Briner (2003) found that attainment
of work goals was associated with pleasurable
affect among call-centre staff, and that this
relationship was stronger for more important
goals. However, neither of these studies assessed
rumination.
One study that assessed goal pursuit and
rumination was conducted by Lavallee and
Campbell (1995), who asked students to list their
life goals and then, one month later, had them
complete a daily diary in which they rated their
mood and described their most bothersome event
of the day and the extent to which they ruminated
about it. Rumination and negative affect were
greater after goal-relevant negative events than
after goal-irrelevant negative events, suggesting
that problematic goal attainment was associated
with negative affect and ruminative thinking.
However, this study did not directly assess
progress on the goals.
Thus, evidence indicates that both rumination
and negative affect are associated with difficulties
in goal progress, but no study has concurrently
assessed rumination, goal success and goal im-
portance. Moreover, past studies have assessed
goal progress daily, typically at the end of the day,
and none of these studies randomly sampled at
the occasion level throughout the day. This
means that the assessment involved retrospective
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and was therefore prone to retrospective reporting
biases. Further, the lack of repeated random
sampling in real-time means that this assessment
method cannot detect contingencies between
events of which participants are unaware, and is
relatively insensitive to the relationships among
goal appraisals, affect and rumination across time
and across different contexts. To overcome these
limitations and to provide a direct test of Martin
and Tesser’s (1996) hypothesis that difficulties in
resolving goals would be associated with rumina-
tion, we conducted an experience-sampling study
(ESM; Csikszentmihalyi & Larson, 1987) in
which adults reported their negative affect, rumi-
native self-focus, and goal appraisals at random
intervals eight times daily for one week. By asking
participants to rate these aspects of their experi-
ence ‘‘online’’, we were able to track fluctuations in
these variables over relatively short intervals, while
reducing retrospective bias.
We measured momentary negative affect as a
composite of sadness, anxiety, and irritation
ratings, on the basis that rumination is associated
with anxiety and anger as well as sadness (Nolen-
Hoeksema, 2000; Rusting & Nolen-Hoeksema,
1998). Momentary ruminative self-focus was
assessed using a two-item measure addressing
the extent to which people were focused on (i)
their feelings and (ii) their problems. Although
not explicitly linked to mood state, these items are
based both on Nolen-Hoeksema’s (1991) defini-
tion of rumination implicating focus on mood and
its causes and on Martin and Tesser’s (1996)
conceptualisation of rumination as relating to
focus on unresolved problems (see also Lyubo-
mirsky, Tucker, Caldwell, & Berg, 1999). On
each occasion, participants noted their most
salient goal, and then rated the extent to which
this goal was important and the extent to which
they were successfully accomplishing this goal.
Based on Martin and Tesser’s (1996) model,
we hypothesised that negative affect and rumina-
tive self-focus would be associated with difficul-
ties in goal progress, particularly for important
goals. We therefore predicted that negative affect
would be associated with low ratings of goal-
related success, and that persons would experience
most negative affect when reporting low levels of
success in the pursuit of important goals. Our key
predictions were that participants would report
high levels of ruminative self-focus on occasions
when they reported low levels of goal success, and
that this relationship would be stronger for more
important goals than for less important goals.
Finally, in exploratory analyses, we tested whether
the predicted relationships between the outcome
variables and the goal variables would differ for
individuals reporting high versus low levels of
depressive symptoms or trait rumination.
METHOD
Participants
Participants were recruited from the University of
Exeter and the local area using e-mails and
newspaper advertisements. One hundred thirty-
nine persons (100 women) consented to take part
(range 18 67 years, M 26.8 years old, SD 
13.3). Most (107) were university students, the
remainder were community adults. Data from a
subset of these participants examining the direct
relationship between negative affect and rumina-
tive self-focus has already been reported (Moberly
& Watkins, 2008). Participants were paid £10
($20) for completing the study.
Materials
Beck Depression Inventory II (BDI-II; Beck, Steer,
& Brown, 1996). The BDI-II assesses levels of
depressive symptomatology using 21 items that are
eachrated onascalefrom0to3,withhigher scores
indicating more depressive symptoms (range
0 63). Cronbach’s alpha for our sample was .90.
Response Styles Questionnaire Ruminative Responses
Scale(RSQ;Nolen-Hoeksema&Morrow,1991). The
RSQ assesses the extent to which individuals
respond to depressed mood by focusing on self,
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their mood (trait rumination), using 22 items that
are each rated on a 4-point frequency scale.
Cronbach’s alpha for our sample was .91.
Procedure
We used ESM to assess negative affect, rumina-
tive self-focus, goal importance and goal success
eight times daily over seven days, using signal-
contingent methodology in which participants
rated their moods and thinking styles when
signalled by an alarm from a wrist-worn actiwatch
(Cambridge Neurotechnology Ltd, Cambridge,
UK). Each participant’s day was divided into eight
equal periods with one alarm occurring at a
random time within each period, with the restric-
tion that no two alarms occurred within 15
minutes. This resulted in a 12-hour daily sam-
pling period (e.g., 10.00 to 22.00) with one alarm
occurring within each of eight 90-minute periods
(e.g., 10.00 to 11.30). Times were individually
randomised for each participant to suit their
sleep wake schedule (actual range: 07.00 23.59).
At each alarm, a flashing letter on an LED
display prompted participants to enter a rating for
the moment before the alarm sounded, by press-
ing a button on the actiwatch to cycle through
ratings from 1 to 7. After each rating was entered,
the next letter was displayed and the participant
made the next rating. The actiwatch only accepted
entries within 20 s of each alarm, ensuring all data
were entered promptly. Participants recorded
their levels of sadness (S), anxiety (N), and
irritation (I), and the extent to which they were
focusing on their feelings (F) and focusing on
their problems (P) on a 7-point scale from 1 (not
at all)t o7( very much). As an aide memoire,
participants carried a card on their person that
explained these prompts.
Participants received booklets for each day of
the study. Each booklet included eight experi-
ence-sampling forms, corresponding to the acti-
watch alarms. On each form, there was a space for
participants to note the current time and any delay
since the actiwatch alarm, and a space to write
down their ‘‘main purpose or goal’’ when the
watch beeped, however trivial. There followed
two Likert scales on which participants were
asked to rate (i) ‘‘How important was this goal
for you?’’, and (ii) ‘‘How successful were you in
achieving this goal?’’ by circling a number from
1( not at all)t o7( extremely). Participants were
instructed that these questions referred strictly to
the moment just before the alarm sounded.
At an initial briefing session, participants
completed the RSQ and BDI-II. Participants
were then shown the actiwatch and experience-
sampling forms, and practised responding to a
hypothetical alarm. Participants were asked to
complete as many accurate reports as possible.
Each participant was then asked to select a
beginning and an end of the daily sampling
period, which were used to configure the acti-
watch. After the week of experience sampling,
participants returned the actiwatch and forms to
the laboratory and were then paid and debriefed.
Data were excluded from 22 participants who
withdrew from the study prematurely (n 13,
ESM was too time-consuming; n 5, actiwatch
malfunctioned; n 1, illness; n 1, family emer-
gency; n 1, experienced mood recording as
upsetting; n 1, ESM interfered with therapy).
Data were also excluded for occasions when the
participant failed to complete the watch and form
ratings within 15 minutes. Timely completion of
the experience-sampling forms was verified with
reference to both (i) the reported time of form
completion and (ii) the reported time interval
between the actiwatch signal and form comple-
tion. Following standard guidelines (Delespaul,
1995), 14 participants who completed less than
one third of the actiwatch ratings and experience-
sampling forms within 15 minutes of the alarm
were excluded from the analysis. Non-completers
did not differ significantly from completers on
BDI-II score, RSQ score, gender, recruitment
source (university recruited vs. community re-
cruited) or age.
Data from 103 participants (75 women) were
analysed (age range 18 67 years, M 25.4
years, SD 12.5). Gender, recruitment source
and age were not significantly associated with
any study variable. The mean response rate for
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(SD 10.8%) and the mean completion rate for
the experience-sampling forms was 63.0% (SD 
15.3%). The total number of occasions that were
validly recorded and analysed was 3631.
We calculated a composite measure of mo-
mentary negative affect by standardising each
of the sad, anxious, and irritated ratings and
summing the resulting z-scores (a .70). We also
calculated a composite measure of momentary
ruminative self-focus by standardising the focus
on feelings and focus on problems ratings and
summing the resulting z-scores (a .67).
Statistical analysis
In our dataset, occasions (Level 1) were nested
within days (Level 2) and within persons (Level 3),
so we used hierarchical linear modelling to test our
hypotheses without violating independence as-
sumptions. We constructed a multivariate multi-
levelmodelinwhichnegativeaffectandruminative
self-focus were modelled simultaneously as a func-
tion of our person-level and occasion-level vari-
ables (see Snijders & Bosker, 1999, pp. 200 206).
Inourmultilevel model,theinterceptwasspecified
as randomly varying at both the day and person
levels, reflecting the fact that observations tend to
be more similar if they are (a) taken on the same
day,and(b)takenfromthesameperson.BDIscore
wasroot-transformedtonormalisethisvariable.To
ease interpretation and reduce multicollinearity,
person-level and occasion-level variables were
centred on their respective grand means.
RESULTS
We first modelled negative affect and ruminative
self-focus with linear and quadratic effects of time
and linear effects of day to control for temporal
variation and reduce the autocorrelation between
successive observations. Both linear effects were
specified as random at the person level to model
individual variation in diurnal and weekly fluctua-
tions. Ruminative self-focus was higher at the
beginning and end of the day than it was in the
mid-afternoon(quadraticeffectoftime,B 2.351,
SE 1.042, pB.05), but no other fixed effects of
time or day were statistically significant. Inclusion
ofthetimeanddayvariablessignificantlyimproved
model fit over the null model, change in log-
likelihood x
2(24) 132.51, pB.001.
Subsequently, to account for individual differ-
ences in negative affect and ruminative self-focus,
we simultaneously added the person-level vari-
ables of depressive symptomatology (BDI-II) and
trait rumination (RSQ). Trait rumination was
significantly and independently associated with
both negative affect and ruminative self-focus, but
depressive symptoms were significantly and in-
dependently associated with negative affect only
(see Table 1). Entered together, these variables
Table 1. Fixed effect coefﬁcients (SE) for multivariate multilevel model
Criterion variable
Predictor Negative affect Ruminative self-focus
Person-level variables
BDI-II 0.548 (0.129)*** 0.109 (0.093)
RSQ 0.028 (0.013)* 0.019 (0.009)*
Momentary goal variables
Importance 0.084 (0.021)*** 0.093 (0.018)***
Success  0.224 (0.019)***  0.113 (0.016)***
Importance success  0.037 (0.009)***  0.014 (0.008)
$
Note: Analyses include 3631 occasions. Model includes linear and quadratic effects of time of day, and linear effect of day. BDI-II Beck
Depression Inventory II score, RSQ Ruminative Response Scale score.
$pB.10; *pB.05; ***pB.001.
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x
2(4) 48.39, pB.001.
Next, we tested our main hypotheses by
simultaneously entering the momentary variables
of goal importance and goal success, followed in a
subsequent step by the goal importance by goal
success interaction. Goal importance was posi-
tively associated with both negative affect (B 
0.102, SE 0.020, pB.001) and ruminative self-
focus (B 0.100, SE 0.017, pB.001). Goal
success was negatively associated with both nega-
tive affect (B  0.214, SE 0.019, pB.001) and
ruminative self-focus (B  0.109, SE 0.016,
pB.001). Inclusion of these variables significantly
improved the model fit, x
2(4) 146.40, pB.001.
When included in a subsequent step, the interac-
tion between goal importance and goal success
was significantly associated with negative affect
(see Table 1) and significantly improved the
model fit, x
2(4) 15.53, pB.001. Figure 1
illustrates this interaction by plotting levels of
negative affect against levels of goal importance
and goal success that are one standard deviation
above and below the mean. As predicted, a
combination of high goal importance and low goal
success was associated with the highest levels of
negative affect. Furthermore, the interaction be-
tween importance and success was also marginally
associated (p .08) with ruminative self-focus. A
plot of this marginally significant interaction re-
vealed a similar pattern to that shown in Figure 1.
In subsequent steps, we tested whether the
association between goal importance, goal success,
the importance by success interaction, and the two
outcome variables would differ for individuals
reporting high versus low levels of depressive
symptomatology or trait rumination. However,
model fit was not improved by adding cross-level
interactions between the momentary variables and
either BDI-II score, x
2(6) 5.56, ns, or RSQ
score, x
2(6) 9.10, ns. Thus, there was no
evidence that the relationship between negative
affect, ruminative self-focus and goal appraisals
was different for persons high in depressive
symptoms or trait rumination.
Concerns about the reliability of the negative
affect composite (median within-person a .50)
prompted us to repeat the above analyses for sad,
anxious, and irritated affect independently.
Results for each affect item were very similar to
those for the composite measure, although
there was no significant association between goal
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Figure 1. Relationship between goal importance, goal success and negative affect. Goal importance and goal success are plotted at values
1 SD above and 1 SD below their respective means.
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ns) even though the effect of goal success and the
importance by success interaction remained sig-
nificant. Each negative affect item was signifi-
cantly associated with ruminative self-focus (all
psB.001), although this relationship was stronger
for sadness (B 0.568, SE 0.021) than for
anxiety (B 0.392, SE 0.021) and irritation
(B 0.335, SE 0.020). Thus, the hypothesised
association between negative affect and low levels
of goal success, particularly for important goals, is
robust across distinct negative affects.
Whenwedecomposedtheruminativeself-focus
composite (median within-person a .64) into its
constituent items and repeated the original ana-
lyses,resultswereverysimilar,withtwoexceptions.
First, focus on problems was independently asso-
ciated with depressive symptoms (B 0.181, SE 
0.079,pB.05)butnottraitrumination(B 0.011,
SE 0.008, ns). Second, the goal success by goal
importance interaction was significantly associated
with focus on problems (B  0.019, SE 0.008,
pB.05) but not focus on feelings (B  0.003,
SE 0.007, ns). During unsuccessful goal pursuit,
the tendency for an individual to report greater
ruminative self-focus when pursuing important
goals is specific to focus on problems.
1
Finally, in univariate models, we examined
whether relationships between the goal variables
and ruminative self-focus were robust when nega-
tive affect was included as a predictor. Goal
importance remained significantly associated
(B 0.062, SE 0.015, pB.001) and goal success
was marginally associated (B  0.028, SE 
0.015, p .06) with ruminative self-focus when
negativeaffectwasincludedinthemodel.Negative
affectwasitselfstronglyassociatedwithruminative
self-focus (B 0.382, SE 0.012, pB.001).
However, the coefficient for the previously mar-
ginal goal importance by goal success interaction
reduced to zero (B 0.000, SE 0.007, ns). Sobel
(1982) tests of the mediated effects of negative
affect on ruminative self-focus were highly sig-
nificant for goal importance (z 5.04, pB.001),
goal success (z 10.58, pB.001), and the impor-
tance by success interaction (z 3.97, pB.001).
Results were very similar when we substituted
individual affect items for the negative affect
composite, with goal success significantly nega-
tively associated with ruminative self-focus in each
analysis (all psB.001). Thus, contemporaneous
negative affect at least partly mediated the associa-
tionbetweenthegoalvariablesandruminativeself-
focus.
Neither goal importance (B 0.077, SE 
0.0152, ns) nor goal success (B 0.008, SE 
0.015, ns) remained significantly associated with
focus on feelings when negative affect was
included in the model. However, both goal
importance (B 0.092, SE 0.014, pB.001)
and goal success (B  0.053, SE 0.014, pB
.001) remained significantly associated with focus
on problems. The goal success by goal importance
interaction was not significantly associated with
either focus on feelings (B 0.006, SE 0.007,
ns) or focus on problems (B  0.006, SE 
0.007, ns) when negative affect was included in
the model. Nonetheless, mediated effects of
negative affect on both focus on feelings and
focus on problems were highly significant for goal
importance, goal success, and their interaction (all
zs]4, psB.001). Negative affect therefore fully
mediated the association between the goal vari-
ables and focus on feelings and at least partly
mediated the association between the goal vari-
ables and focus on problems. However, our cross-
sectional measurements preclude us from drawing
causal conclusions from these findings.
2
1 These results were robust when sadness, anxiety or irritation items were each analysed in place of the negative affect composite
(i.e., when both the ruminative self-focus composite and the negative affect composite were decomposed), although the association
between trait rumination and mean levels of irritation no longer reached significance. Once again, sadness was not associated with
goal importance.
2 An identical pattern of results emerged when sadness, anxiety or irritation items were each analysed in place of the negative
affect composite, with the exception that goal importance remained significantly associated with focus on feelings when sadness was
included in the model.
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To our knowledge, this is the first experience-
sampling study to examine negative affect and
ruminative self-focus simultaneously as a function
of goal appraisals and individual differences in
depressive symptoms and trait rumination.
Although a few previous studies (e.g., McIntosh
et al., 1995; Millar et al., 1988) have examined
whether differences in the extent to which
individuals ‘‘link’’ lower-order goals to higher-
order goals are associated with negative affect and
ruminative thinking, they have not directly ex-
amined how appraisals of importance and success
for idiographic goals are associated with rumina-
tion. Thus, direct evidence pertaining to the
Martin and Tesser (1996) theory of rumination
is minimal. Moreover, the current study also built
upon prior research by examining momentary
relationships between goal appraisals, negative
affect and ruminative self-focus multiple times
daily in an ecologically valid context. Thus, this
study provides the first direct test of the predic-
tions of Martin and Tesser’s (1996) theory of
rumination in everyday life.
Withrespecttoourkeypredictions,thefindings
relating to ruminative self-focus were consistent
with some but not all the predictions from Martin
and Tesser’s (1996) model of ruminative thought.
Consistent with the model, at the within-person
level, participants reported higher levels of rumi-
native self-focus both when reporting low levels of
goal success and when pursuing important goals.
However, the interaction between goal success and
importance failed to reach conventional levels of
statistical significance, although ruminative self-
focus tended to be highest when participants were
reporting low levels of success on important goals.
Though requiring replication, these results offer
partial support for the notion that ruminative self-
focus is associated with problematic goal attain-
ment and most intense when these difficulties
relate to important goals (Martin & Tesser, 1996).
More specifically, when we decomposed the
ruminative self-focus composite, goal importance
moderated the relationship between perceived
success and focus on problems, but did not
moderate the relationship between perceived
success and focus on feelings. Thus, the findings
were consistent with Martin and Tesser’s theory
of rumination for problem-focused rumination
but not for emotion-focused rumination. That is,
when important goals go badly, individuals are
more likely to ruminate about problems, but the
occurrence of emotion-focused rumination is
associated with factors above and beyond the
interaction of goal success and goal importance.
This pattern of findings is consistent with the
emphasis of Martin and Tesser’s (1996) theory on
the problem-based nature of rumination, with a
focus on non-clinical populations. However, it
raises questions as to whether the Martin and
Tesser (1996) theory can fully account for Nolen-
Hoeksema’s (1991) characterisation of rumination
as a focus on symptoms and feelings. The failure
of the interaction of goal success and goal
importance to predict focus on feelings may be
consistent with Nolen-Hoeksema’s (1991) con-
ceptualisation in which the development of a
response style is more central to explaining why
people ruminatively focus on negative moods.
Our finding of a negative relationship between
perceived goal success and negative affect supports
the self-regulatory principle that negative affect is
associated with low perceived rates of goal pro-
gress (Carver & Scheier, 1990). This was true
across distinct negative affects, although goal
importance was more strongly associated with
high-arousal affect (anxiety, irritation) than with
low-arousal affect (sadness). Results also sup-
ported the view that rumination is associated
with a range of negative affects (Nolen-Hoek-
sema, 2000; Rusting & Nolen-Hoeksema, 1998),
although sadness had an especially strong rela-
tionship with ruminative self-focus.
When predicting negative affect, we found
evidence for the hypothesised goal success by goal
importance interaction: at low levels of goal
success, participants experienced greater levels of
negative affect when they were pursuing impor-
tant goals. A goal’s importance may be increased
by various factors (Carver & Scheier, 1998,
pp. 90 91), such as if it is: (a) situated at a more
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tive to a more concrete behavioural level in a
person’s motivational hierarchy; (b) associated
with the attainment of multiple other goals; (c)
associated (‘‘linked’’; McIntosh et al., 1995) with
higher-level goals (e.g., ‘‘Be happy’’) that capture
broad principles of self-regulation. Because they
are more likely to be central to the person’s sense
of self, discrepancies on such goals may be
associated with particularly high levels of negative
affect.
Unsurprisingly, negative affect was strongly
associated with ruminative self-focus. Associa-
tions between the goal variables and ruminative
self-focus were reduced when negative affect was
included as a covariate, particularly for the focus
on feelings component. Although our cross-sec-
tional measurement occasions prevent us from
specifying a causal meditational model, these
results suggest that goal appraisals may be asso-
ciated with a feeling-focused component of
rumination through their shared relationship
with negative affect, but that goal appraisals may
be more independently associated with a problem-
focused component of rumination. Prospective
relationships between goal appraisals, ruminative
self-focus and negative affect may be addressed by
more sophisticated experience-sampling designs
incorporating sequential data points and structural
equation modelling.
We found no evidence that the relationship
between goal appraisals and either negative affect
or ruminative self-focus differed for individuals
who reported high versus low levels of either
depressive symptomatology or trait rumination.
Though this finding may be related to our non-
clinical sample, an implication is that ruminative
self-focus and negative affect are relatively typical
concomitants of difficulties in goal pursuit. In this
regard, it is important to point out that rumina-
tive self-focus as operationalised here is not
necessarily maladaptive, but rather reflects Martin
and Tesser’s (1996) more inclusive conceptualisa-
tion of rumination, in which rumination can be
adaptive or maladaptive. Our measure of rumina-
tive self-focus did not capture the abstract,
evaluative, and repetitive styles of thinking that
characterise more dysfunctional forms of rumina-
tion (Watkins, 2008). Future experience-sampling
studies using more elaborate measures of rumina-
tive self-focus may be able to assess these adaptive
and maladaptive cognitive styles and analyse them
as a function of goal appraisals, person-level traits
and their interaction.
We acknowledge some limitations. First, our
sample consisted mainly of undergraduates, who
may have a more homogeneous range of goals
than other adults. Second, there may have been an
under-representation of certain situations (e.g.,
driving) in which participants could not complete
the measures. Third, although we asked partici-
pants to write down the time they completed the
form, we could not rule out retrospective comple-
tion of the goal ratings. Fourth, we did not ask
participants to rate the discrepancy between their
perceived and desired rates of goal progress, which
corresponds more closely to control theory ac-
counts of affect generation (Carver & Scheier,
1990). Fifth, because participants recorded their
goal appraisals shortly after rating their negative
affect, concurrent associations between these
variables cannot establish that negative affect
and ruminative self-focus were caused by particular
goal appraisals. Negative affect may lead indivi-
duals to appraise their goals more negatively (e.g.,
Cervone, Kopp, Schaumann, & Scott, 1994).
Finally, it is unclear to what extent the ESM
process exaggerated the relationships between
variables, given that heightened self-focus (in-
duced here by self-ratings) is believed to increase
the salience of goal discrepancies (Carver &
Scheier, 1998).
It is noteworthy that this research focused on
negative affect rather than on positive affect.
These two constructs are believed to represent
orthogonal rather than bipolar affective dimen-
sions (Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1988). It
remains for future investigations to determine
whether positive and negative affect exhibit an
asymmetrical relationship with motivational ap-
praisals, given that negative affect is hypothesised
to interrupt behaviour and initiate goal reprior-
itisation to a greater extent than positive
affect (Simon, 1967). Future experience-sampling
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COGNITION AND EMOTION, 2010, 24 (4) 737research could also test Carver and Scheier’s
(1998) proposal that the quality of positive and
negative affect (e.g., excitement vs. relief, dejec-
tion vs. anxiety) depends on whether the person is
self-regulating with respect to an approach or an
avoidance goal.
By asking participants to make goal appraisals
as they went about their everyday lives, we were
able to show that ruminative self-focus and
negative affect are elevated when people experi-
ence difficulties in goal attainment, consistent
with one prediction from Martin and Tesser’s
(1996) theory of rumination. Importantly, the
support that we provide for motivational models
of negative affect and ruminative thought derives
from momentary experience-sampling measures
with high ecological validity. Further research
could investigate under what circumstances these
affective and cognitive sequelae are associated
with increased effort mobilisation and goal dis-
engagement, and under what circumstances they
are associated with more maladaptive responses
that maintain goal discrepancies and prolong
distress.
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